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WORLD LAW AND WORLD COURT
ERNEST BRUNCKEN*

N DISCUSSING the question of what sort of an institution an
international court should be to make it proper for the United
States to support it, I shall assume that such a tribunal, and more particularly one that is to comprise all governments of the world, will have
for its main purpose the gradual reduction, and finally, the total abolition, of, war between nations. In other words, it must be competent
to draw within its jurisdiction issues of such importance that, unless
the Court intervene, governments may be expected, with reason, to go
to war for their decision, notwithstanding the enormous sacrifices which
even a victorious war demands, and the fundamental unreasonableness.
of war as an instrument of obtaining national ends, which, as an abstract proposition, everybody admits.
Moreover, I shall assume that such a court is to be a court of law
and not a mere committee of arbitration. It does not require much
analysis to comprehend that an arbitration is not judicial process at all,
edicept as an auxiliary means, but is in its essence merely a special
form of diplomacy. Therefore, no arbitration' between independent
states ever has prevented a war, or will ever be able to do so, for the
reason that it is not resorted to until the governments concerned have
made up their minds not to go to war anyway. Experience shows that
in most cases arbitrations result in compromises, which is proof of
itself that the arbitrators did not decide on what is right but what is
expedient. If the distinction between justiceable and non-justiceable
international issues has any clear meaning at all, it must be that a
question is justiceable when it is of such minor importance that an
adverse decision would affect no vital interests of the losing nation; and
in practice, it does mean just that. Even when a nation agrees to a
so-called compulsory arbitration, it merely promises in advance to submit to the judgment of disinterested persons such minor issues, but
reserves to itself the right of determining whether an issue is justiceable or not; nor does that change the fact that the tribunal will consider
what is expedient in the premises, rather than what is right. There is
nothing but a formal analogy between an arbitration tribunal and a
court of justice. A court decides not what is wise and prudent for the
parties to do, but what they have a right to do no matter how inexpedient insistence upon such right may appear in practice.
* Member of the Milwaukee Bar.
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By an international court of justice, I therefore mean a tribunpl
which decides what the rights of the parties are; and the notion of
right depends on the existence of a binding law which creates such
rights; and the first question I shall discuss is whether the existing
World Court at The Hague is such a tribunal.
It will be useless to go a single step further unless we first clear our
minds regarding a fundamental difference that exists regarding the
nature of law itself. In every group of lawyers there will be some who,
either from the nature of their training, or tradition, or intellectual
predisposition, adhere to the conception which, in the English-speaking
countries, we connect with the name of John Austin and the so-called
analytical school. They will maintain that law is nothing more than
what the supreme power in the land commands; that law is what the
government enforces either as a standard of judicial decision or as an
executive rule of action. To persons of this way of thinking, the
question of adhering to the World Court must seem a comparatively
trifling detail. If they proceed logically, they must first create an
international super-government to make a law which a world court may
apply. In practice, they should advocate our joining the League of
Nations and accept its court as a matter of detail. For if they have any
faith at all in the possibility of abolishing war, they must look to a
political rather than a juridical organization for accomplishing that
purpose. To them, law is a mere tool of politics, having no force, meaning, dignity, or even existence, except such as the political branches of
government give it.
I am happy to observe, however, that, at the present time, a majority
among those of us who give serious thought to these fundamental questions seem to belong to another type of lawyer. For these the Law
is a much more important and fundamental thing than it is to the
Austinians. It precedes, logically and even historically, the political
functions of the State. It takes its origin in the habits and customs
followed by the people in their intercourse with each other, together with
those notions of just and moral conduct which are generally accepted
among their fellow men. It is the function of courts to formulate these
customs and notions into rules and precepts, so that they may be better
understood in all their bearings and consequences. As social conditions
become more complicated, it becomes expedient that the political departments of the government should also help in the task of formulating, expanding, and, from time to time, even correcting the formless
mass of customary law; but it is an axiom of wise and effective legislation to keep all statutory law, and all other rules created by governments, in full accord with the existing habits, customs, and moral principles of the people.
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If such is the true conception of law in its fundamental character,
there is nothing illogical or impracticable in the adherence of the United
States to a world court, even while we utterly refuse to make ourselves
subject to a political world government such as the League of Nations
is in its conception and would be in practice, if it ever acquired the
requisite prestige and power.
Whether or not we should favor our joining such a tribunal will then
'depend on whether we consider it to possess the necessary characteristics of a Court of Law. That is to say, we must inquire whether the
Court has at its service a body of formulated law according to which
it may render decisions; and as the reason for our joining such a court
is not merely to smooth the way for the settlement of minor disputes,
but a hoped-for possibility of preventing war, we must also inquire
whether the law within the jurisdiction of the Court deals with those
subject matters out of which war threatens to grow from time to time,
as shown by history and a study of human nature.
The theses I desire to establish are therefore:
i. That at present there. is no body of world law regulating matters
of sufficient importance to threaten war;
2. That it is practicable and desirable to create such a body of law
by agreement among the nations, and
3. That for the purpose of promoting such legislation it may be
expedient for the United States to adhere to the existing World Court,
with modifications and restrictions substantially like those provided in
the various measures now pending in Congress.
I
THE PRESENT LAW

op

NATIONS

in an assembly of lawyers, it is superfluous to do more than recall to
your attention that what is commonly known as international law is in
no sense world law, if thereby be meant a body of rules deriving sanction either from the mutual agreement of all the governments on the
globe, or from custom to which mankind as such, independent of national divisions, has with common consent adhered. It is nothing more
than the domestic law of the several sovereign entities, and international
only in the sense that it deals with the relations of the government to
other governments, or with those of citizens of one nation to those of
another, so far as each government separately chooses to recognize such
relations as affected by rights and duties. Or you may call it international law because a part of it, at least, is a Jus gentium, a law of all
the nations in the ancient Roman sense, being uniform everywhere. Its
nearest analogy is our own common law; when a Wisconsin court administers a rule of the common law, it may indeed be identical with the
corresponding rule of New York, or of England; but it is nevertheless

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

Wisconsin law alone, and not law derived from some super-authority
to which Wisconsin, New York and England are equally subject.
This is not a mere theoretical distinction, but one of grave practical
consequences. The first of these is that any proposed world court cannot have any jurisdiction to administer any sort of customary law, for
all custom is the custom of a definite nation, though it may be uniform
with that of other nations. Whatever law a world court may consider
binding, it must be derived from some rule to which the governments
affected thereby have given their assent, expressly or by necessary implication. Hence it is eminently proper that the constitution of the present world court contains a section (Art. 38) enumerating the sources
where may be found the law-such as it is-which the court is to apply,
and including therein, among other things, the so-called "principles of
international law" and the "writings of recognized international jurists."
The second consequence of the really national character of the law
of nations is that, as a matter of fact, there is hardly a single provision
of what is commonly called international customary law which either
has not at some time been repudiated by one nation or the other, or is
not liable to be so repudiated. The only exceptions are rules of morality
so elementary that nobody will think of disputing their binding force.
Probably no nation today will claim the right of gouging out the eyes
of their prisoners of war, or of selling the women and children of their
enemies into slavery. Beyond that, I am not so sure that there is a
single rule of international law definitely considered binding under all
circumstances. No nation hesitates to exercise upon occasion its sovereign right as an independent state, to amend or repeal that portion of
its national law which goes by the name of international. During the
late World War, every belligerent, without a single exception, has deliberately broken rules of conduct which, during peace, had been solemnly proclaimed as international customary law in public declarations,
in the writings of experts, and in the decisions of arbitration tribunals.
This was done, not as pardonable offenses in the heat of the struggle,
not by over-zealous subordinates, but by the governments themselves,
officially, and with a claim of right because the safety of their respective
countries required it. A rule, which may be set aside by any party subject to it whenever such party deems its effect disadvantageous to itself,
certainly cannot be called law in any reasonable sense of the word.
But even in times of peace, long-standing and highly important rules
of international custom have failed of recognition by some nations.
There are few rules of greater antiquity, and more definitely asserted in
the books, than that the national jurisdiction extends into the open sea
no farther than a cannon shot would carry, or one marine league. Yet
in the hard-fought case of the Ship Franconia (Queen v. Keyn, L.R.
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Exch. Div. 63, 292. 1876) the British courts decided that no such
rule was binding on Great Britain, and it was necessary to pass an act
of Parliament to bring that country into line with the rest of the world.
The principle underlying this actual condition of international law is
found in the fact that no country, either today or in the past, has ever
dared to base its conduct toward other countries on juridical instead of
political grounds. Political action is of necessity based, ultimately, on
physical force; but the law is based, in its last analysis, on some principle of ethics inherent in the constitution of the Universe itself. The
circumstance that the political authorities usually have the duty of enforcing obedience to the law often leads incautious thinkers to assert
that law also is based on force. The fallacy is easily discovered. When
the judgment of the court has correctly decided to whom a piece of
property belongs, every person feels that if he disobeys that judgment.
he is dishonest, although obedience will render him penniless. He does
not obey simply because he is afraid of the sheriff; and if he should
choose to disobey because the sheriff somehow could not reach him, he
would yet in his heart know he was doing wrong. In the intercourse
of nations, until now, such feeling of a duty going far beyond the mere
fear of the greater physical power of one's opponent, has never yet been
an effective motive. No government has yet been found to say: "It is
true, if we surrender to our neighbor this disputed territory, we shall
cease to be a powerful state, and our people shall be tremendously
handicapped in their economic and cultural activities; yet we are willing
to surrender it because it is clear that our opponent has the better title
to that province." Not until the universal public opinion of the world
has come to that stage, can the relations of the various countries be said
to be on a basis of law, instead of force.
What is now called international law is simply a feeble compromise
between the rule of force and the rule of law. With a few trifling exceptions, it deals with nothing more than the so-called rules of civilized
warfare. In other words, it recognizes war as the normal method of
settling international disputes, but endeavors to soften the terrors and
cruelties inherent in war. A little clear thinking will show the futility
of this attempt. If my life depends on killing my enemy, and it is
admitted that I am justified in defending my own life to the extent even
of killing him, it is useless to call out to me, while we are clinching in
the death struggle: "Use only one hand in strangling him! You hurt
him too much by using both !"
It is evident, therefore, that the customary part of so-called international law, except as its provisions are also part of the law of the several nations, is not law at all in any true sense. How is it with
international treaties and conventions? Surely these constitute a body
12
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of law. It is in effect recognized as such by the parties, and is as fit to
be interpreted and applied to the facts by a court as are the domestic
laws.
An affirmative answer to such a question seems obvious at first, but
upon closer analysis doubts arise. When two private parties enter into
a treaty-we call it a contract in their case-they discover that the
laws of their country are very far from upholding their treaty just
because they both signed it. The document may contain provisions
flagrantly unfair to third parties; then the courts will hold it void for
being against public policy; or its provisions may contemplate immoral
acts, or may be prohibited by law, and again it is held void; or it may
have been induced by fraud, or one of the parties has signed it because
of fear of injury or death. In all these cases the law holds the contract, be it ever so solemnly attested, null and void, or at least voidable
at the will of the party. None of these safeguards exist in the case of
international treaties. There is no law permitting the World Court to
scrutinize the contents of a treaty or to inquire into the circumstance
of its signing, and to hold it void in such cases as would avoid any
private contract. All it can do is, if necessary, to interpret a doubtful
meaning of the text and to ascertain the facts with a view to finding
whether the treaty is applicable to them. Of itself, that is a valuable
function. The World Court has already decided a number of cases of
this character. Arbitration tribunals also, for generations, have again
and again interpreted texts, ascertained facts, and by the light of such
incidental, quasi-judicial labors formulated their awards on the basis
of expediency and compromise. Yet, wars have followed each other
with dreary regularity and there is not the slightest prospect that they
will cease, until a body of law is created that will regulate the intercourse of nations, or governments, in times of peace. Then the "rules
of civilized warfare" and the elaborate doctrines regarding the rights
of belligerents and neutrals, and of the capture of ships and cargo at
sea, and the rest of what now mocks our juridical conscience by a
shadowy imitation of real law, would become obsolete in short order.
II
A

GENUINE INTERNATIONAL LAW

If the immense mass of international treaties now considered to be in
force and forming the basis of the present political geography of the
globe, could be subjected to the same scrutiny to which private contracts are subjected in order to insure their conformity to the law of
contracts, there is little doubt that easily one half of them would be
thrown out as invalid. In fact, the books on international law recognize this when they lay down the doctrine that the class of treaties,
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known as political ones, are considered valid only rebus sic stantibus,
as long as the state of the world is as it is at the moment of signing. In
accord with the prevailing foggy character of so-called international
law, it is not clear just what the authorities mean by political treaties.
Sometimes, the term is restricted to treaties of alliance or neutrality, and
analogous agreements. At other times it may include all treaties touching the sovereignty of the "high contracting parties," like treaties of
disarmament, or fishing and navigation rights of aliens in territorial
waters. Again, the term may embrace delimitations of national boundaries. It depends, I suppose, on whether you are interested in upholding or avoiding any given treaty. Similarly, the clause rebus sic stantibus is delightfully vague. Who shall say what mundane change alters
or does not alter the circumstances on which the continuance of such a
treaty depends? Laymen, and I am sorry to say, some lawyers, are
apt to be profoundly ignorant of this curious character of treaties, and
fondly imagine them to be in the nature of contracts which an honest
man keeps even to his own hurt. Sometimes even leading politicians
display this naive ignorance, like the German Chancellor at the outbreak of the World War, who quite needlessly made a shamefaced
admission that he marched into Belgium in defiance of a treaty. He
might have said that the changed circumstances had abrogated the
treaty of Belgian neutrality, and would have been just as honest in
saying so as all the professional diplomats and international jurists in
the world.
Aside from the fact that political treaties are mere shams as a matter
of diplomatic principle, it is also true that practically all the frontiers in
Europe and Asia, and a large number of those in the Western hemisphere, are the results of treaties obtained under duress after wars.
The vicious principle of basing the relations of one government toward
another on force, instead of law, invades even such apparently innocent
affairs as commercial treaties entered into in times of nominally profound peace. For many a small country has consented to making unfavorable commercial arrangements, from fear of the threatening
power of a large neighbor.
Against all these evils and injustices, which of necessity will breed
a constant succession of wars, the existing World Court, or any world
court that might be substituted for it, is for the present as powerless
as the engineers of the world are against the procession of the equinoxes.
Before a court can aid in the prevention of war, we must somehow
create a body of laws which will lay down definite rules regarding the
rights and duties of nations, rules as definite, although possibly not as
complex, as those regulating the relations of man to man in our domestic law.
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Sometimes, it is imagined that the World Court itself will gradually
create such rules as a body of what some people choose to call "judgemade law." This is a misconception. Judicial analysis can never
create legal principles; it can only develop those given to it either by the
unconscious growth of custom or by deliberate acts of legislation. It
is true that very important and extensive fields of jurisprudence have
been thus developed, both in the common law jurisdictions and in countries where written codes prevail; I need only recall to you the whole
vast field of equity. However, in all such cases, the underlying principles have been given to, not developed by the judiciary. The World
Court will have to be furnished with the seed from which to grow a
crop of international, judge-made law; and as there is no world government which may legislate by virtue of its supreme authority, we
shall have to agree upon the principles from which an elaborate body
of living world law may some day be developed by the World Court.
Legislation by agreement is nothing new in legal history. I only need
to recall the manner in which our federal government was created by
sovereign states agreeing on the principles of a common, partial
sovereignty.
It is impossible to forecast with accuracy what the character of this
future world law will be, or to predict what parts of international conduct will be covered by it. Only this would seem altogether certain,
that the present international customary law will occupy a very small
portion of the field and will constantly shrink in importance, as the
object for which alone world law has a reason to exist is more completely realized, which is the elimination of force and war from the conduct of civilized peoples. There are a few broad departments, however, which quite obviously will have to be covered at the very beginning of the new era of law instead of violence.
To my mind the first and most far-reaching step of world legislation
should be to bring all treaties, conventions, and agreements between nations under a rule analogous to that of private contracts. Without
some law of this kind it is useless to hope for the abandonment, by any
self-respecting people, of the possibility of righting its wrongs by force
when opportunity offers. Where, as has happened not so very long
ago, a belligerent, approaching exhaustion but still able to defend himself for a long period, is induced to lay down his arms and render himself helpless, by promises that peace will be made on the basis of a fair
compromise, embodied in a series of definite propositions; and where
his enemies thereupon, disregarding their fourteen points, force upon
him a treaty calculated to destroy his economic life, render him defenseless for all future time, take away his colonies, cut off one fourth of
his nationals and place them under alien governments notoriously filled
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with bitter race hatred against them, and finally force upon their victim
a pretended confession of crimes that should put him outside of the
pale of humanity-a law which would recognize a treaty of this kind as
valid could not possibly command the obedience and respect of mankind. The world legislation will have to declare, for the future at least,
any such agreement void on about every ground on which contracts
may be avoided: fraud, duress, repugnancy to public policy, immorality.
It is a fact, however, that almost every treaty of peace concluded since
the day when the Romans circumvented the need of any treaty by either
killing or selling into slavery the entire Carthaginian people, would have
to be declared void on similar grounds, although these may not always
lie so open to the light of day as in the cases of Versailles and St. Germain. The crazyquilt condition of national boundaries in Europe, and
the diabolical mess of hatred and fear between nations the world over,
are the result of the vicious and absurd system of compelling a government by superior power, to sign a disadvantageous agreement under
conditions of force, violence, incendiarism, and bloodshed, and then
expecting the people thus abused to live up to such an agreement with
loyal good faith and in a spirit of friendship to their tormentors.
This custom of centuries filled with incapacity and wrong having
become impossible for the future, the next step toward substituting a
reign of law for force will be to adopt a set of definite principles according to which the boundaries of the several nations and governmental
units may be arranged. The principle of the self-determination of
peoples has fallen into some disrepute because it has so often been inyoked hypocritically for purposes the reverse of just. Yet I do not
believe that a better foundation for the territorial division of the globe
could be found. Any fairly compact region inhabited by people recognizing the obligations of civilized life, having common traditions, language, economic interests, and a degree of consciousness of belonging
together, and being distinct from other similar groups, should be, primarily, entitled to live under an independent government of their own,
and the world code should establish this right. The actual condition
of the globe, however, makes the literal realization of the principle obviously impossible. It will have to be modified by definite rules recognizing the effect of geographical, economic, and social circumstances
which create a practical necessity for a certain number of one nationality
living under the sovereignty of another. Instead of trying to blind
itself to such considerations, the law would provide rules for the just
government of these alien elements-rules of law, but not discretionary
commands as are now being attempted in similar cases by the political
agencies of the League of Nations. The code would also recognize
the existence of a number of empires, uniting under a single sovereignty
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various nationalities and national states. This is, in many cases, an
arrangement advantageous to all concerned. One of these empires, the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, has just been forcibly dismembered,
with the result that each of the component nationalities is more miserable and dissatisfied than ever before. The world code would recognize
such composite governments as historical growths, but would afford
legal rules calculated to prevent injustice to any of the constitutive
national or political units.
A third group of international relations which must be regulated by
world law in order to eradicate one of the most important sources of
war danger consists in the treatment of those parts of the world inhabited by so-called uncivilized races, perhaps better described as
peoples on a low plane of economic and social development. In close
connection therewith, the code should provide rules to prevent unfair
and hostile discriminations in the obtaining of the natural products that
serve as raw materials for the industries of mankind.
Probably by this time you will be ready to exclaim: "A pretty big
job, to bring about an international law of this kind !" So it is. But I
am firmly convinced that no other way is open by which the abolition
of war may some day be realized. It seems to me little more than sentimental play, to agitate for the substitution of "law for war," for universal disarmament, and other things of that sort, unless we first create
a world law. Political methods, such as are contemplated by leagues of
nations, by proposed super-governments with armies to keep the peace
as an international police, by improved facilities for arbitration, associations for making war upon war, and all the rest of these well-meant
activities, must necessarily fail because these methods are all based on
force exercised at the discretion of some superior power. They can
only perpetuate the feelings of fear and hatred between nations, which
form the psychological background of the pre-sent miserable condition.
Moreover, such political agencies will prove even more difficult to make
effective and permanent than the creation of a code of laws. It will be
found that they can live only if they busy themselves with comparative
trifles, after the manner of arbitration tribunals. I believe that all unprejudiced observers will find this -to be the case with the activities of
the present League of Nations. Such institutions unquestionably are
convenient and useful in .many ways, but they have nothing to do with
the abolition of war.
I do not expect that a code of genuine international law will or can
be established next year, or the year after next. There are too many
selfish interests in the several countries, each of which would find itself
disadvantaged by one necessary provision or the other in any proposed
code. It is not necessary that the World Law should spring from a
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single international conference, all complete and fully armored, as
Pallas Athene sprang from the head of Zeus. It is quite possible to
cover at first only a few subjects, those encountering least resistance.
Which those may be, and how such legislation may best be brought
about, is not a legal question but one for politicians and diplomats. As
lawyers, however, I hold it to be our duty, first to clear our own minds
by discussion and study; and next, when we are convinced that a world
law can and should be created, to throw our whole professional weight
into the scales, so as to induce the proper political authorities to take
the necessary steps toward a beginning. I can discern certain tendencies in economic life which before long may bring some extremely
powerful allies to the aid of the movement. I mean the growing tendency of gigantic combinations of capital to expand their interests
without regard to national boundaries, especially in developing sources
of raw material. They will soon discover the advantage of having such
enterprises protected, to a certain extent at least, by world law, instead
of being at the mercy of conflicting, narrow, and selfish national interests, and in all disputes having to rely on the use of force, or the
threat of force, by their home governments; especially as such aid may
be given freely or grudgingly, as purely political exigencies may suggest. The moment that these interests succeed in getting the several
governments to agree on laws applicable to their particular affairs, other
interests, economic, social, racial, cultural, will want similar laws regulating the subjects closest to their hearts. The current toward a genuine
international code may then set in with a rush that will sweep aside all
opposing nationalistic or partisan interests and ambitions.
III
THE PRESENT WORLD COURT AND THE UNITED STATES

I believe that these considerations amply show how a World Court,
to be effective for preventing war, must be a court of law, and not a
mere arbitration tribunal with the usual auxiliary functions of a judicial
character; and they prove further, that such a World Court of Law
cannot exist until there is a code of international law, regulating those
important fields of intercourse between nations from which wars are
likely to arise. If that is true, the first impulse will be to conclude that
the United States have no reason to adhere to the World Court maintained under the auspices of the existing League of Nations; especially,
as there is danger that by such adhesion our government might appear
as guaranteeing any part of the treaty under which the League of Nations was created-to guarantee it, notwithstanding the emphatic repudiation of both the treaty and the League by the American Government as well as the American people.
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Some very able and influential members of tl'e United States Senate
have drawn that conclusion and are vigorously combatting the participation of our country in the World Court, as proposed by President
Coolidge and his predecessor.
Nevertheless, I am inclined to believe that no harm can come either
to our country or the cause of permanent peace, if we join the Court;
and that some good may be accomplished thereby, particularly in the
direction of bringing about the creation of a genuine and effective code
of world law. Provided, of course, that sufficient guarantees are given
by the other governments: first, that we are not held in any way to
guarantee the repudiated treaties of I919, or any other international
political arrangements in Europe; and secondly, that we are to have a
voice of fully equal weight with any power, member of the League or
not, in all matters concerning the constitution of the Court and the election of judges and officials. These reservations are substantially contained in the various measures now pending before the Senate.
As we have repeatedly asserted, the World Court at present is substantially a committee on arbitration, a tribunal of expediency and good
policy rather than of law. There would seem to be no particular reason why it would not be as good an arbitration committee for us as the
old Hague Court, still functioning side by side with the World Court.
We are fully committed to the practice of arbitration in all justiceable
cases, but it is for ourselves to judge whether a dispute is justiceable
or not. The discretionary function of the Court does not exclude, however; its exercise of properly judicial functions where, and as far as,
there is any law covering the subject of litigation. We have seen that
every arbitration tribunal which ever sat has done so, in the interpretation of treaties, the ascertaining of facts according to legal methods,
and upon other occasions. The constitution of the World Court expressly authorizes such judicial functions, especially in regard to the
interpretation of treaties "establishing rules expressly recognized by the
contesting states" (Section 38, par. i of Statute establishing the Court).
This provision, it seems to me, implies that while there may be few such
rules now, many more may be adopted by interilational conventions.
If the United States is a member of the World Court we shall be in
a much more favorable position to urge the adoption of such rules than
if we are mere outside critics. Moreover, we shall be able to participate
in the eventual amendment of the court constitution, so as to change it
from a primarily arbitrating commission into a truly judicial body.
These considerations seem to me to outweigh entirely the objections
drawn from the connection of the Court with the League of Nations, or
any fancied predisposition to enveigle the United States into mingling
with the turmoil of European political troubles. The latter could only
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be done by provisions in awards, imposing on us political functions in
Europe, such as supervising the execution of treaties to which we are
not parties. There is nothing compelling us to accept such unwelcome
honors.
After all, our present participation or non-participation in the World
Court is only indirectly of importance. What is of the greatest importance to the people of this country, and to the whole world, is the
creation of a World Law, the transfer of international relations from
the dominion bf force and arbitrary violence to that of orderly procedure and justice. As lawyers, we have a special duty, and I trust a
special inclination, to do our share in bringing about such a signal triumph of the beneficent power to which our profession is consecrated,
the power of Justice through Law.

